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Curiously, the connection between civil rights and civil wrongs has not 
been a topic that has captivated the attention of large numbers of legal scholars 
over the years. The distance that has developed between the two fields likely 
reflects their placement on opposite sides of the public–private divide, with 
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes forming part of public law, 
while torts is a classic, private law subject. To compound the division, both 
subjects are to some extent still under-theorized. Employment discrimination 
scholarship is often caught up in the process of analyzing the doctrinal 
implications of the latest Supreme Court cases, with less attention paid to big 
picture questions. For its part, torts scholarship still has relatively little to say 
about social equality or harms related to discrimination, despite the recent 
growth in tort theory.1 
This Symposium is a product of our conviction that the time is ripe for 
serious consideration of the intersection of these two fields, owing principally 
to recent developments in the U.S. Supreme Court. In 2011, the Court 
expressed its view that when Congress created “a federal tort” through 
enacting Title VII, it “adopt[ed] the background of general tort law.”2 Three 
years later, the Court reiterated that it regards Title VII as a statutory tort. In a 
5–4 opinion adopting the “but-for” causation test for use in retaliation cases, 
the majority declared that tort rules should be treated as “the default rules [that 
Congress] is presumed to have incorporated, absent an indication to the 
contrary . . . .”3 
The Court has not always been so intrigued by tort law. Up until the late 
1980s, the Court hardly mentioned tort law in Title VII cases, instead relying 
on the purposes underlying Title VII and the language of the Act to guide its 
interpretations.4 From the late 1980s to 2009, it employed a more balanced 
approach, sometimes using tort as a supplementary tool to help it decide cases 
in particular contexts, but being careful to adapt tort principles to the purposes 
and needs of anti-discrimination statutes.5 However, since Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc. was decided in 2009, rejecting mixed-motivation 
analysis and adopting the “but-for” causation test for ADEA cases,6 and 
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particularly since Staub v. Proctor Hospital incorporated the controversial 
concept of proximate cause into anti-discrimination law in 2011,7 the Court 
has stepped up its project of “taking up” tort law to resolve employment 
discrimination disputes. Clearly something new is afoot that has taken many 
academics in both fields by surprise. 
 As the contributions to this Symposium attest, the Court’s rapid moves 
have begun to inspire a rethinking of the “basics” in both fields, forcing us to 
tease out the similarities and dissimilarities in these two regimes ostensibly 
dedicated to righting wrongs and deterring harms. Several scholars 
participating in this Symposium deserve credit for initiating the dialogue 
through their publication of articles examining the Court’s borrowing of tort 
principles for use in Title VII and ADEA cases,8 most notably in 5–4 decisions 
in favor of employers. Meanwhile, the American Law Institute—the 
organization responsible for creating the Restatements of Law, including the 
highly influential Restatement of Torts—has been quick to point out the record 
number of times the Restatement had been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the past year.9 There can be little doubt that this Supreme Court has 
rediscovered “the common law” and is using it to reshape anti-discrimination 
law. Even the EEOC has gotten into the act. It refers to tort principles in its 
new guidance on disparate impact under the ADEA, although the agency gives 
the importation of tort principles a more plaintiff-friendly twist.10 
This move to incorporate common law principles into statutory anti-
discrimination claims has already proven controversial, with several Title VII 
scholars being openly skeptical or critical of this development.11 We have not 
heard as much yet from tort scholars, in part because the migration has largely 
been a one-way street—moving tort principles into civil rights law rather than 
infusing tort law with civil rights norms and principles. However, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that the migration occasionally shifts direction when, 
for example, common law courts take a page from Title VII harassment law to 
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inform the tort concept of “outrageous” conduct12 or use anti-discrimination 
principles to prohibit the use of gender-based or race-based economic data in 
computing loss of future earning capacity in garden-variety tort actions.13 
Additionally, although we have recently come to associate the incorporation of 
tort principles with pro-business, pro-defendant outcomes, the contributions in 
this Symposium demonstrate that such a simple equation is not inevitable as a 
matter of theory or doctrine, given that tort law has the potential to expand 
remedies for discrimination victims as well.  
The unique aspect of this Symposium is that it brings together civil rights 
and torts scholars for the first time to analyze the intersection of their fields. 
Some of us have used this opportunity to step back and reflect, while others 
have sharpened and deepened our critiques. Because of its cross-field nature, 
the Symposium has taken many of us into uncharted waters, generating a mix 
of theory and doctrine, blending references to discrimination based on race, 
sex, age, disability, and genetics and taking differing approaches to tort law. It 
focuses simultaneously on big questions about the compatibility of public and 
private law and the limits of the judicial interpretive process as well as on 
smaller, practical questions related to the integration of specific civil rights and 
tort doctrines and principles. 
Although the articles in this Symposium are far too diverse and wide-
ranging to summarize in a paragraph, there are some recurring themes that 
break through the surface and deserve particular attention. There seems to be 
wide agreement that incorporating tort principles into anti-discrimination law 
is (or at least should be) a complex process, going well beyond labeling Title 
VII a statutory tort.14 At a minimum, if done well, the tortification process 
requires identifying the precise elements of tort law to be taken up, critically 
examining the content of those strands of tort law, and being aware of the high 
degree of selectivity in the process, whereby only some strands of tort law are 
chosen for incorporation while other possible features of the common law are 
not so selected.15 Indeed, the selectivity of the incorporation process has 
prompted several contributors to speculate about the effect on Title VII (and 
other anti-discrimination laws) if different tort doctrines were incorporated or 
different tort analogies were drawn,16 demonstrating the indeterminacy of both 
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bodies of law. This Symposium has also sharpened the debate over the 
potential costs of privileging private law principles and modes of reasoning 
over more “purposive” interpretive approaches that emphasize the distinctive 
civil rights or public policy objectives of anti-discrimination laws.17 In 
particular, several contributions in this Symposium note that tortification has 
mainly served to solidify the regime of at-will employment, placing 
management prerogatives ahead of the equality interests of employees.18 In 
favor of torts and common law, however, many contributors see torts as a 
valuable resource for certain discrimination victims who find the remedies 
under the status-bound statutory schemes inadequate.19 
Four contributions in the Symposium present broad overviews and 
reflections on the tort incorporation process. The opening selection, What Is 
Troubling About the Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law? by 
William R. Corbett, provides a comprehensive retrospective on the 
incorporation controversy, examining the various ways in which an 
employment discrimination claim is or is not “tortlike.”20 Calling the 
tortification process “potentially pernicious” and responsible for producing an 
“asymmetrical and chaotic” body of employment discrimination law, Corbett 
nevertheless holds out hope for reform through more careful analysis and 
adaptation of tort law to the employment discrimination context.21 Charles A. 
Sullivan’s contribution, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other 
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, meditates on the judicial 
interpretive process and offers the core insight that courts “can draw on only a 
limited number of concepts,” making resort to basic tort principles 
understandable and unexceptional.22 Taking the varying judicial constructions 
of the term “employee” as his example, however, Sullivan asks the probing 
question why the Court sometimes reaches for “more technical, common law 
meaning[s,]” rather than interpreting the law in line with an “ordinary, 
contemporary, [or] common meaning” derived from real-world experiences 
and social practices.23 In a penetrating thought experiment, Sandra F. 
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Sperino’s Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort spells out how very different 
the body of employment discrimination law might look if courts took the tort 
analogy seriously.24 Her observation that tort law is “both a set of substantive 
choices and a methodology” opens up the possibility of infusing civil rights 
statutes with a dynamic version of tort law that responds to changing 
circumstances, including “new understandings about the way that 
discrimination is perpetrated.”25 Finally, torts scholar W. Jonathan Cardi looks 
beneath recent judicial rulings to discover an “embrace of tort concepts [that] 
runs even deeper than [courts] have expressly stated.”26 The Role of 
Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases asserts that 
the all-important tort concept of “duty”—along with policy considerations 
commonly relied on to limit duties—may help explain the outcomes of 
employment discrimination cases, with concern for employer freedom and at-
will employment functioning as the equivalent of a “no-duty” rule.27  
Standing back from the current incorporation debate, Maria L. Ontiveros 
and Catherine E. Smith envision alternative models for Title VII liability that 
would set the law on a more progressive course.28 Rather than reach for tort 
law for guidance, Ontiveros argues that courts should be mindful of the 
powerful history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “gave life to basic, 
fundamental principles upon which our Constitution and overall systems of 
laws are based and which the country demanded.”29 The Fundamental Nature 
of Title VII sets out a broader vision of Title VII by placing it in the context of 
the other important titles of the 1964 legislation, treating it as a “super-
statute,” and considering the equal right of individuals to own and use their 
labor as an aspect of human rights law.30 By way of contrast, Smith believes 
that “tort law is a logical and valuable” source of principles for courts in 
employment discrimination cases.31 In Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks 
of Workplace Discrimination, however, Smith argues for a new approach to 
torts borrowing that would authorize courts to address and regulate implicit 
bias as part of its torts-like function of “rooting out conduct in the workplace 
that poses risks of discrimination.”32 Finally, with respect to disability and 
genetic discrimination, Ifeoma Ajunwa and Laura Rothstein take a “both/and” 
approach, arguing that vigorous enforcement of broadly-conceived tort and 
anti-discrimination statutory protection is necessary to capture the wide range 
of harms in these relatively new areas of civil rights. In Genetic Testing Meets 
Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues, Ajunwa addresses the harms, in the 
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workplace and beyond, arising from inadvertent disclosure of genetic 
information obtained by genetic testing.33 In Disability Discrimination 
Statutes or Tort Law: Which Provides the Best Means to Ensure an Accessible 
Environment?,34 Rothstein discusses the complex legal landscape facing 
wheelchair users and other individuals with mobility impairments when they 
attempt to use law to make the physical environment more accessible. 
The final three Symposium contributions tackle two discrete, fast-moving 
areas of civil rights law: the law of harassment and retaliation law. In Two 
Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 
Martha Chamallas criticizes the Court’s importation of common law tort and 
agency principles to narrow the scope of employer vicarious liability in Title 
VII harassment cases.35 Reminding us of the infamous “fellow servant” rule 
that virtually closed off tort recovery for employees injured on the job—and 
the markedly different structural features of torts versus Title VII law—she 
maintains that incorporation is “anomalous” because “[t]here is really little of 
value to borrow here.”36 Gravitating towards tort law, in Conceptualizing 
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, L. Camille Hébert 
borrows from French, Canadian, and E.U. law to explore whether 
discrimination victims might benefit from treating sexual harassment as a 
“dignitary tort.”37 Mapping the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress onto fact patterns in hostile environment cases, she finds 
potential in using a dignity tort frame to supplement, but not supplant, Title 
VII’s discrimination frame.38 The Symposium concludes with a contribution 
by Deborah L. Brake who excavates dozens of lower court cases to reveal 
“how tort principles have quietly taken root in retaliation law[.]”39 In 
Tortifying Retaliation: Protected Activity at the Intersection of Fault, Duty and 
Causation, Brake’s assessment is that “tort analogies may have more staying 
power in retaliation than the rest of employment discrimination[,]” as courts 
increasingly rely on no-duty and proximate cause reasoning to limit the 
threshold of what counts as protected activity and which employees are 
protected from retaliatory measures.40  
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